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CIV. 3-76-48 
POST-TRIAL BRIEF OF TENNESSEE 
VALLEY AUTHORITY 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves a direct collision of two 
philosophies as to how the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
should be applied, if at all, to the Tellico project. Plain-
tiffs advocate a strict literalistic approach to the Act. 
While they admit that in completing the project TVA has .done 
everything humanly possible to conserve the snail darter, 
they contend that the Act should be applied without regard 
to the circumstances of this case; that TVA has violated the 
Act; and that an injunction must issue regardless of the con-
sequences and loss of public investment. TVA insists that 
under the circumstances of this case, TVA has not violated 
the .Act; that the Act must be interpreted and applied in 
light of reason so as to effectuate the intent of Congress; 
and that this Court sitting as a court of equity should apply 
the traditional principles of equity in considering all of 
the circumstances of the case, weighing and balancing the 
equities as they affect the parties and the public interest, 
and exercise its sound judicial discretion in determining 
whether to grant or deny an injunction. 
The two issues framed by the Court are (1) will 
the completion of the Tellico project result in a violation 
of the Endangered Species Act under the circumstances of this 
case, and (2) shou~d the Court in its sound discretion grant 
or deny an injunction. 
Inasmuch as the Court has already ruled on the 
question of the retroactivity of the Act, we shall forego 
further discussion of that subject without waiving the point. 
TVA has recognized from the outset that there is 
no· way the Tellico project can be completed without altering 
or modifying the critical habitat as presently described. 
It is TVA's position, however, that the modification of the 
critical habitat does not constitute a violation under the 
peculiar circumstances of this case, and that even if it did 
constitute a technical violation, the Endangered Species Act 
does not mandate an injunction, and that the Court in the 
exercise of its sound judiclal discretion should deny plain-
tiffs' request for an _injunction. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
Completion of the Tellico Project Will Not 
Violate the Endangered Species -Act. 
A. Congress intended the project to be completed. 
The goal the Court is seeking is to effectuate the 
intent of Congress. The problem is not so much the general 
question of what the Endangered Species Act means in the 
abstract sense, but rather the specific question as to what 
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extent, if any, Congress intended that Act to apply to this 
project. More specifically: Did Congress intend the Act 
to ap.ply so as to halt the Tellico project? 
Given the fact that Congress knew the project was 
in its final stages of completion, and the further fact that 
there is no possible way the project could be completed-with-
out altering or modifying the snail darter's critical habi-
tat, it is difficult to understand how any one could seri-
ously question what Congress intended when it appropriated 
funds for the project. It certainly could not be contended 
that the funds were to be used to demolish the dam and start 
up. some new project. The only possible use to which the 
funds could be put was to go forward with the project. That, 
of course, is exactly what the House committee instructed 
TVA to do after TVA had brought the problem to Congress, as 
was more fully discussed in our two previous briefs. The 
committee expressed its view in these terms: 
The bill provides the budget request of 
$23,742,000 for construction of the Tellico 
dam reservoir. The Committee uirects that 
the project, for which an environmental 
impact statement has been completed and 
provided the Committee, should be completed 
as promptly as possible for energy supply 
and flood protection in the public interest 
[H.R. Rep. No. 94-319, 94th Gong., 1st Sess. 
76 (1975)].1 
This unequivocal language is not open to doubt as 
to what the committee intended. The committee consisted of 
Congressmen from thirty-two states, includ~ng the Valley 
States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky, Georgia, 
and Virginia; and there was not a single dissent as to this 
decision. The Senate committee was similarly representative. 
As we have stated in our previous briefs, TVA fully 
explained this entire snail darter controversy, not just once 
1 Emphasis added unless otherwise noted. 
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but twice, to both the House and the Senate committees in 
appropriation hearings, pointing out, among other things, 
that TVA did not interpret the Act as requiring the project 
to be halted; that the critical habitat would necessarily be 
altered ormodified; that TVA would do "our best to conserve 
the darter while completing the project"; but that "[i]ri any 
event, however, we believe the Tellico project must be com-
pleted on schedule." It is our view that when a fully in-
formed Congress takes action in the form of appropriating 
.,...~,...~--,.-,-.~-.-··~..,...~-"""' 
funds under such circumstances, it is the strongest possible 
evidence of congressional intent short of a special act of 
Congress specifically exempting the project entirely from 
the provisions of the Endangered Species Act. 
Plaintiffs concede, if we understand their posi-
tion, that if the intent of Congress is that the project go 
forward the Court should honor that decision. They argue, 
q however, that this is a "political" decision arid that the 
i 
only way the intent of Congress can be shown would be for 
TVA to persuade Congress to enact a special law exempting 
Tellico from the provisions of the Endangered Species Act. 
We disagree completely with that view and consider that sug-
gestion to be a misunderstanding of the legislative process. 
Plaintiffs have suggested no reason whatever why Congress 
cannot make known its intention that a previously authorized 
project shall go forward to completion under such conditions 
as Congress desires, or why such intent cannot be revealed 
through the appropriation process. Plaintiffs can draw no 
support whatever from the case of Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. 
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), which they cite in 
their brief. As the Supreme Court pointed out at page 244 
of its opinion, the sole basis of the court of appeals' de-
cision regarding the agency's "violation" was that the 
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agency lacked statutory authority to grant the pipeline 
right of way, and an act of Congress was required to confer 
the necessary authority. It is elementary law that a govern-
ment agency cannot act beyond its statutory authority. 
There is no question but that TVA has statutory authority 
to construct the Tellico project. 
~fhat Congress has done in our case is not to under-
take an amendment to the Endangered Species Act, but simply 
to acquiesce in or ratify TVA's interpretation of that Act 
as it applies to the Tellico project and to support TVA's 
view that TVA should complete the project while doing the 
best it could to conserve the darter. The recent c~se of 
United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Tracts of Land, 456 F.2d 
264 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972), is direct 
authority for the proposition that a court may look to appro-
priations hearings in seeking the intention of Congress as 
to statutory construction, and also for the proposition that 
the appropriating of funds by Congress to enable the agency 
(TVA) to carry on a certain program "demonstrated its inten-
tion" as to how a statute should be construed. 
It is clear to us that when Congress appropriates 
funds for a project under the circumstances of this case it 
certainly cannot be said that TVA has "violated" the law. 
Call it what you will--congressional interpretation of the 
Act, acquiescence, endQ~s~atification, or whatever--
!' . t! \ . 
the plain fact is that Congress Uas approved the action TVA 
. ·. ~ 
has taken. Such action on the part of Congress does not 
constitute legislation, for none is needed, nor does it con-
stitute an amendment to the Endangered Species Act, for no 
such amendment is required, despite what plaintiffs would 
have us believe. 
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Plaintiffs' argument that the action of the 
appropriation committees of the House and Senate in recom-
mending the requested presidential appropriations does not 
reflect the will of Congress is utterly devoid of merit. 
These special committees are selected by Congress for the 
specific purpose of delving into all the ''pr.os" and "cons" 
of appropriating funds for each of the various projects. 
Their hearings.and reports are published and made available 
for congressional use. 
These congressional committees were confronted 
with a basic question of public policy. \.Jould the public 
interest be best served by proceeding with the Tellico pro~ 
ject in its present stage of completion, or by strict pres-
ervation of the ·snail dartervs habitat under the Endangered 
Species Act? That was clearly a legislative or political 
question, and the Court should honor the congressional deci-
sion thereof. 
TVA does not contend that the mere appropriation 
of funds, without more, indicates an intention on the part of 
Congress that the project should be continued to completion. 
Any cases relied upon to that effect are wholly beside the 
point. But when Congress has been informed of the specific 
problem and has been advised by the agency what action it 
proposes to take (in this case, complete the project on 
schedule), and then appropriates funds for that very purpose, 
coupled with the statement of one of the committees that the 
committee "directs" the agency to complete the project as 
quickly as possible "in the public interest," there can be 
little doubt as to the intent of Congress. The case then 
falls squarely within the principle applied in the case 
of Environmental Defense Fund,· Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 
492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974), involving the Tennessee-
Tombigbee project in which the court said Congress was the 
6 
decisionmaker and that while the court had the power to 
review the question, judicial review was "inapposite and 
unnecessary." The scope of judicial review will-be dis-




\'-'''/B. TVA has not acted arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or otherwise 
not in accordance with 
law. 
The standard of judicial. review to be applied in 
case as stated in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe; 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), is whether the action of 
th~ agency was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. In applying 
this test, however, the Supreme Court noted that: 
Although this inquiry into the facts is 
to be searching and careful, the ultimate 
standard of review is a narrow one. The 
court is not empowered to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency [at 416]. 
This is the test that has been uniformly followed 
and was applied in the most recent case of Sierra Club v. 
Froehlke, No. 75-1252 (8th Cir., April 23, 1976), involving 
the Indiana bat, which points out that the Endangered Species 
Act must be construed in a reasonable manner. In the words 
of the court: 
This Act, as any other, must have a rea-
sonable construction [at 34]. 
Also with respect to the duty of the agency under 
section 7 of the Act to consult with Interior, the court in 
the Indiana bat case said: 
Consultation under Section 7 does not re-
quire acquiescence. Should a difference 
of opinion arise as to a given project, 
the responsibility for decision after 
consultation is not vested in the Secre-
tary but in the agency involved. National 
Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, F.2d 
, No. 75-3256 (5th Cir. filed March 
~1976) [at 32]. 
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Applying these basic principles to our case, it is 
abundantly clear that TVA has not acted arbitrarily, capri-
ciously, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The rec-
ord is overwhelming and undisputed to the effect that TVA has 
cooperated with Fish and Wildlife (~vS) one hundred percent. 
TVA has furnished FWS with virtually every minute piece of 
information it has with respect to the snail darter from the 
date TVA learned of its discovery (November 1973) to the 
present time. 
Even before the Act became law (December 28, 1973), 
TVA was considering a request submitted by Dr. Etnier for 
TVA to fund a program to study the life of the snail darter 
and to prevent its possible extinction by transplanting it 
to other rivers. This culminated in an agreement between 
TVA and The University of Tennessee (September 1974) whereby 
TVA would fund such a program. Following that, TVA set up 
its own large-scale conservation program to transplant the 
darter and also to search for its existence elsewhere (June 
1975). This was five months before the darter was officially, 
listed as an endangered species :(November 1975). 
As a result of TVA's conservation program and re-
search, over 700 of these snail darters have been trans-
planted to the Hiwassee River; 2
 
and TVA has found it below 
Tellico Dam and as far as 10 miles downstream in the Watts 
Bar Reservoir and in Chickamauga Dam Reservoir, 85 miles 
downstream from the Tellico Dam. 
Since December 1974, TVA has been in constant 
communication with the FWS with respect to the Act and this 
fish. There has been an extensive exchange of correspon-
dence, together with meetings, telephone conferences, 
2 Section 3(2) of the Act (16 U.S.C. § 1532(2) (Supp. 
IV, 1974)) defines the term "conserve" to include "trans.,. 
plantation" of .species. 
reports, etc., with respect to every phase of the problem. 
TVA has furnished the Department of the Interior with all 
relevant and requested information, too voluminous and ex-
tensive to summarize here. Indeed, it is undisputed that 
TVA has done everything humanly possible to conserve the 
/ ~/~----~ 
darter except to scra~~he entire project. We can concieve 
~-/ 
of no factual basis on which it could be said that TVA has 
acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law. 
Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs' contention, 
modification of critical habitat is not a prohibited act 
under the Endangered Species Act. Section 9, which lists 
the acts prohibited under the Act, prohibits the "taking 11 
of endangered species. However, Congress expressly deleted 
"the destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habi-
tat or range" from the list of prohibited acts. (Compare 
the original language of section 3(6) of Senate Bill 1983, 
which u~timately became law, with section 3(14) of the Act.) 
Section 7 (entitled "Interagency cooperation"), on the other 
hand, directs federal agencies to utilize their authorities 
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. by taking affirma-
tive action to conserve endangered species in actions "au-
thorized, funded, or carried out by them, 11 with the ultimate 
decision to be made by the agency subject to appropriate re-
view by the court. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, No. 75-1252 
(8th Cir., Apr. 23, 1976). It is TVA's position, as more 
fully developed in its previous briefs, that TVA has fully 
complied with section 7, since in carrying out the congres-
sionally mandated Tellico project, TVA has, in consultation 
with Interior, used its authority in furtherance of the pur-
poses of the Act by doing everything humanly possible to in-
sure the continued existence of the snail darter while 
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carrying out the project. This position is in no way 
inconsistent with the Mississippi sandhill crane case. There 
the program could be carried out, with slight changes, with-
out modifying the critical habitat, and to not modify the 
project under the circumstances of that case would indeed be 
arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the purposes of. the 
Act, 
We think there is no substance to plaintiffs' con-
tention that TVA has violated the Endangered Species Act by 
continuing with the construction of the project under the 
circumstances of this case. As we have stated above, TVA 
had but two choices: either scrap the project entirely, or 
continue with its construction to completion. Faced with 
this choice, TVA promptly took the problem to Congressf and 
the decision was to complete the project as authorized in 
accordance with the congressional mandate. Under these cir-
, l cums tances , any consultation with Interior with res pee t to ~-/) 
that course of action would obviously be a futile gesture. / 
It is clear that the ultimate decision of whether or not to 
complete the project rests with TVA. Sierra Club v. 
Froehlke, supra. It is equally clear that Congress agreed 
with that decision and that, in the light of such congres-
sional endorsement or ratification, TVA 1 s action can by no 
stretch of the imagination be characterized as arbitrary, 
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 
II 
The Court in Its Sound Judicial Dis-
cretion Should Deny Plaintiffs' 
Request for Injunction. 
In their trial brief at page 16 plaintiffs open 
their argument on 11Balancing the Equities" by saying: 
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[T]he laintiffs do not consider it 
appropriate for tte Court to pro e into 
or consider the public values, benefits, 
and costs nor the ercenta e of com le-
tion of the Tellico Project in or er to 
enforce the law by issuing an injunction. 
To ih any way permit the defendant TVA to 
present evidence to the Court in this 
cause relative to the amount of money 
spent on the Tellico Project and the per-
centage of completion to date will, in 
reality, open up the whole issue of the 
benefits and values of the Project versus 
the detriments and disadvantages of same. 
Again, at page 17, plaintiffs say: The 
fact that a project is 60% or 80% ~om­
plete has no per se relevance to bal-
ancing the equities . . .. 
This philosophical approach is basic to plain-
ti-ffs' entire case, and we respectfully submit that it is 
patently fall?-cious and that without this argument plain-
tiffs have little else to stand on. The law is clear that 
the stage of completion of a project is an important factor 
to be weighed by the Court in applying the Act and exercising 
its equitable discretion. Environmental Defense ~und v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(Tellico I); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engi-
neers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) (Gillham Dam), cert. 
denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Sierra Club v .. Callaway, 499 
F.2d 982 (SthCir. 1974) (Wallisville Datn); Arlington Coali-
tion on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.),· cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
In affir.ming the district court's decision which · 
dissolved a previously granted injunction for .the plaintiffs, 
the Eighth Circuit, in the Gillham Dam case said:· 
We have reached this conclusion after a 
serious consideration of the arguments in 
favor of and against completion of the 
project. In large part this had necessi-
,tated a balancin~, on the one hand, of 
the benefits to e derived from flooa-
/control, and, on the other, of the im-
.. portance of a diversified environment. 
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We have also taken into account, as we 
must, that the overall project was au-
thorized by Congress eleven years priOr 
to the passage of NEPA, and was sixty- · 
three percent completed at the date this 
action was instituted. Almost ten mil-
lion dollars has been expended and would 
be lost if the project were completely 
abandoned now [470 F.2d at 301]. 
Not only is this an established principle of law, 
but Congress was informed of the threat of litigation on the 
issue involved in this case for the purpose of obtaining 
congressional direction on the course TVA was to follow. 
Congress responded by its decision to appropriate funds for 
the continued construction of the project. 
In recommending the full amount requested for 
Tellico, the committee stressed the "enormous contribution 
to America" that has been made by various projects for water 
supply, power development, flood control, navigation, recla.-
mation, and recreation saying that they represent "a sub-
stantial investment in the future of our Nation, an invest-
ment that will pay rich dividends in services and economic 
benefits for the American people" (H.R.' Rep. No. 94-319, 
94th Gong .• 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1975)). It also pointed out the 
lasting value of such projects. 
The coR~ittee believes that the jobs 
created by the construction funds in this 
hill are more beneficial to theAmerican 
people than those jobs cr~ated by tempo-
rary public service programs. The re-
sults of the productive jobs created by 
this bill--electric power on line, flood 
control facilities constructed, improved 
harbors and navigation, expanded ·irriga-
tion--will benefit the American people 
for decades to come [Id. at 5]. 
These are some of the considerations which led 
the committee to conclude, despite its knowledge that the 
project would destroy, alter, or curtail the habitat of the 
snail darter, that the project· should be completed: 
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The bill provides the budget request of 
$23,742,000 for construction of the 
Tellico dam reservoir. The Committee 
directs that the project, fqr which an 
environmental impact statement has been 
completed and provided the Committee, 
should be completed as promptly as pos-
sible for energy supply and flood pro-
tection in the public interest [Id. at 
76]. -
As we have said previously, the guiding star for 
the Court's decision is the effectuation of the intent of 
Congress. It is Congress that speaks for the public, and 
it is Congress that establishes public policy. It weighed 
the effect of the Endangered Species Act on this project, 
and it decided that the project should go forward in the 
public interest. 
In exercising its discretion, the Court should 
take into account, among other things, the advanced stage of 
completion of the Tellico project (80%); the enormous public 
investment at stake (approximately $80 million); the late 
discovery and listing of the snail darter as endangered 
(November 1975); TVA's good faith efforts to conserve the 
snail darter through scientific study (the UT contract and 
TVA studies); transplantation (to the Hiwassee and Noli-
chucky Rivers); existence of the darter elsewhere (the 
Watts Bar and Chickamauga finds); and most importantly, the 
action of Congress in appropriating over $29 million for 
the Tellico project with full knowledge of the Endangered 
Species Act and the effect of the project on the snail 
darter. 
Since plaintiffs have conceded that the Court has 
inherent equitable powers to exercise its sound discretion 
to grant or deny an injunction under the Endangered Species 
Act, we shall not brief that matter further but simply rely 
upon the authorities cited in our earlier briefs. 
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As we pointed out in our trial brief, TVA brought 
this snail darter to the attention of both the House and 
Senate appropriation committees. A copy of TVA•s statement 
was attached as an appendix to that brief, and for the· 
Court's convenience is also attached as an appendix to.this 
brief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and under all the cir-
cumstances of this case, we respectfully submit that the 
Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, 
should deny plaintiffs' reques·t for an injunction and that 
the action should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Charles A. Wagner Ill 
Assistant General Counsel 
~a,~ ~edersen · 
!J!d::ft:lr&!!t:: tU"b-
·Attorneys· for Defendant 
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